On Vertical Decision-making under the Stackelberg Game of Complementary Products Supply Chain
LU An-wen1, CHEN Lang2
1.School of Economics and Management， Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications， Chongqing 400065， China 2.School of Management， Chongqing University of Humanities and Science and Technology， Chongqing 401524， China
Abstract：Based on two complementary products supply chains consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer as the research objects， this paper discusses the inter-chain Stackelberg and intra-chain Stackelberg game problems when complementary products supply chains adopt different decision-making modes， examines the influence of market size， cost and other parameters on market price， demand and profit， and further compares and analyses the equilibrium solutions under the four decision-making modes （centralized-centralized， centralized-decentralized， decentralized-centralized， decentralized-decentralized） in the inter-chain Stackelberg game. The research shows the following results： The production cost of complementary products is negatively correlated with demand and profit； The price of a product is negatively correlated with the cost of complementary products； Centralized decision-making is the dominant strategy of complementary products supply chain leaders； For the supply chain follower， whether to adopt centralized decision-making or decentralized decision-making depends first on the decision-making mode of the supply chain leader， and secondly on the degree of complementarity between products； The centralized-centralized decision-making mode is the Pareto equilibrium solution of the complementary supply chain. Therefore， an incremental profit sharing mechanism can be designed among members of the complementary supply chain to ensure the stability of centralized decision-making in the supply chain； Complementary supply chains should cooperate with each other to reduce product costs and achieve cost reduction and efficiency increase， and lower the price of a certain supply chain product to attract users so as to promote consumer demand for complementary products， thus maximizing the profits of the complementary supply chain.
卢安文, 陈浪. 互补品供应链Stackelberg博弈下纵向决策研究[J]. 北京交通大学学报(社会科学版), 2024, 23(1): 125-137.
LU An-wen, CHEN Lang. On Vertical Decision-making under the Stackelberg Game of Complementary Products Supply Chain. journal6, 2024, 23(1): 125-137.
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2024, Vol. 23 
