The Impact of the Accountability System for Illegal Operation and Investment on State-Owned Enterprises’ Focus on Their Primary Responsibilities and Main Businesses

ZHOU Shao-ni; DU Qi-yue; ZHOU Zhi-tian

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Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University（Social Sciences Edition） ›› 2026, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (1) : 124-140.

The Impact of the Accountability System for Illegal Operation and Investment on State-Owned Enterprises’ Focus on Their Primary Responsibilities and Main Businesses

ZHOU Shao-ni, DU Qi-yue, ZHOU Zhi-tian

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Abstract

Promoting State-Owned Enterprises （SOEs） to focus on their primary responsibilities and main businesses is a critical measure to enhance their core functions and achieve high-quality development. This paper utilizes a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2023 to investigate the practical impact of strengthening investor supervision on SOEs’ strategic focus. Exploiting the staggered provincial implementation of the Accountability System for Illegal Operation and Investment as an exogenous institutional shock， we employ a time-varying Difference-in-Differences （DID） model to systematically examine the system’s impact and the underlying mechanisms through which it influences SOEs’ core business focus. The study finds that Accountability System for Illegal Operation and Investment has a significant driving effect on SOEs’ focus on their core businesses. Mechanism analysis shows that the accountability system restrains executives’ irrational diversification motives by constraining risk appetite， and improves internal control and information transparency by enhancing corporate governance， thereby driving SOEs to concentrate on their primary responsibilities and main businesses. Further research reveals that the driving effect of the Accountability System for Illegal Operation and Investment is more pronounced in SOEs with high managerial myopia， low executive promotion expectations， or those located in regions with lower levels of marketization. This study concludes that policymakers should continue to leverage accountability as a “regulatory sharp tool” to enhance supervisory efficacy. Efforts should be directed toward refining the SOE investor supervision system and advancing long-term， sustainable monitoring mechanisms. Moreover， implementing differentiated regulatory strategies and building sophisticated risk identification systems are vital for further deepening the reform of state-owned assets and enterprises， optimizing the strategic layout of state-owned capital， and achieving high-quality development.

Key words

strengthened investor supervision / accountability for illegal operation and investment / primary responsibilities and main businesses / risk preference / corporate governance

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ZHOU Shao-ni, DU Qi-yue, ZHOU Zhi-tian. The Impact of the Accountability System for Illegal Operation and Investment on State-Owned Enterprises’ Focus on Their Primary Responsibilities and Main Businesses[J]. Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University（Social Sciences Edition）. 2026, 25(1): 124-140

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