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| Study on the Evolutionary Game of Manufacturers’ Low-carbon Production Under the Dual Constraints of Government Regulation and Public Scrutiny |
| LI Guo-zhi, YUAN Na, YAN Shi-xuan, LOU Meng-wei |
| School of Business， Wenzhou University， Wenzhou Zhejiang 325035， China |
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Abstract Using evolutionary game and numerical simulation methods， we investigate the low-carbon production behavior of the manufacturers under the dual constraints of government regulation and public scrutiny， and compare the enterprises’ decisions under static and dynamic reward-penalty mechanism.The study reveals the following finding： Under the static reward-penalty mechanism， when the constraint of public scrutiny is strong， the local governments can ensure that the enterprises choose low-carbon production by adjusting their strategies. When the constraint of public scrutiny is weak， regardless of whether the constraint of government regulation is strong or weak， they cannot ensure that the enterprises choose low-carbon production. In specific， when the constraint of government regulation is strong and the local governments’ regulatory benefits exceed regulatory costs， the probability of enterprises choosing low-carbon production oscillates. Then， if the local governments implement dynamic reward-penalty mechanism， the probability of the enterprises choosing low-carbon production will show a significant convergence trend. Moreover， when the penalty amount and reputation loss increase， the probability of the enterprises choosing low-carbon production will increase. But when the reward amount increases， the probability of low carbon production will decrease. In order to promote the low-carbon transformation of manufacturers， government regulation and public scrutiny should be further strengthened. In terms of government regulation， the dynamic reward-penalty mechanism should be implemented， with emphasis putting on penalties and supplemented by rewards.
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Received: 15 February 2023
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