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| Game Analysis of Traffic Department Supervision and Evolution of Traffic Participants’ Illegal Occupation of Emergency Lane |
| MU Ling-ling1, TU Jia-ting2, FU Yi-fan3 |
1.School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin 300401, China
2.College of Public Administration, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan Hubei 430074, China
3.College of Management and Economy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China |
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Abstract Aiming at illegal occupation of emergency lane by social vehicles on roadsides of city loop， expressway and highway， the evolutionary game model between traffic participants and traffic department is constructed by considering the supervision and reporting by third-party public and the use of electronic monitoring. By establishing the replication dynamic equation， the stable evolution strategies of traffic department and traffic participants are obtained through evolution stability strategy analysis and simulation analysis. The research shows that the decision-making of both traffic department and traffic participants tends to observe the principle of maximization of revenue or the principle of lowest cost. The higher the third-party reporting rate and electronic monitoring capture rate， the smaller the income loss ratio， and the more likely the traffic department is to adopt passive supervision. The greater the punishment and the higher the cost of cooperation with investigation， the higher the success rate of active supervision by the traffic department. Under the premise of ensuring a high success rate of regulation， the traffic department tends to choose passive supervision strategy. Therefore， it is suggested that traffic department can adopt new technology to reduce cost and increase efficiency， call on the public to actively report illegal occupations and strengthen supervision and punishment to prompt two sides to take game strategy that develop in the direction conductive to the supervision of traffic department.
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Received: 08 September 2020
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